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Recent studies on conspiracy theories employ standardized questionnaires, thus
neglecting their narrative qualities by reducing them to mere statements. Recipients are
considered as consumers only. Two empirical studies—a conventional survey (n = 63)
and a study using the method of narrative construction (n = 30)—which were recently
conducted by the authors of this paper—suggest that the truth about conspiracy theories is
more complex. Given a set of statements about a dramatic historic event (in our case 9/11)
that includes official testimonies, allegations to a conspiracy and extremely conspiratorial
statements, the majority of participants created a narrative of 9/11 they deemed plausible
that might be considered a conspiracy theory. The resulting 30 idiosyncratic stories imply
that no clear distinction between official story and conspiratorial narrative is possible
any more when the common approach of questionnaires is abandoned. Based on these
findings, we present a new theoretical and methodological approach which acknowledges
conspiracy theories as a means of constructing and communicating a set of personal
values. While broadening the view upon such theories, we stay compatible with other
approaches that have focused on extreme theory types. In our view, accepting conspiracy
theories as a common, regulative and possibly benign phenomenon, we will be better
able to understand why some people cling to immunized, racist and off-wall stories—and
others do not.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, narrative construction, personality science, individual differences, external validity,
regulation, psychological methods
INTRODUCTION
“Superstition is actually a symptom of enlightenment, whoever is
superstitious is always, [. . . ] much more of a person; and a super-
stitious society is one in which there are many individuals and
more delight in individuality”
(Nietzsche, 1882/1974, p. 96).
So far, many psychological studies on conspiracy theories
have confined themselves to a simple—yet often misleading—
paradigm: The assumption that a clear distinction between an
official truth and delusive idiosyncratic explanations can bemade,
and that supporters of conspiracy theories must hence be con-
sidered as individuals who have lost touch with reality and are
in need for clear-cut explanations. Unfortunately, this reproach
of oversimplification also applies to the methods commonly used
to investigate conspiracy theories: The frequent use of question-
naires implies that conspiracy theories can be reduced to simple
statements and that recipients of conspiracy theories can be seen
as passive consumers who can be “diagnosed” by specific items.
How do these basic assumptions account for the vast major-
ity of conspiracy theories emerging from the highly interactive
sphere of the new media? Why are conspiracy theories about
9/11 far more complex and disquieting than the official ver-
sion if they are supposed to provide simple answers? Why are
contradictory explanations for Princess Diana’s “disappearance”
deemed equally plausible (see Wood et al., 2012)? This contrasts
Goertzel (1994) who noted that conspiracy thinkers “offer the
same hackneyed explanation for every problem” (p. 741), and
not several contradicting explanations for one discrete event.
And finally: Why are conspiratorial plots nearly omnipresent
in contemporary literature, in movies and on television? The
entertainment value of conspiracies should also be taken into
account when explaining the unsolicited, excursive, and mutating
dissemination of such theories.
It seems that research on conspiracy theories has often empha-
sized cognitive peculiarities of people who adhere to conspiracy
theories, suggesting that believers in conspiracy theories are spe-
cific cases who have not much in common with the majority of
people. As such, the ordinary actor is often a blind spot of cur-
rent research, as has recently been pointed out by Sapountzis and
Condor (2013).
In sum, we feel that it is time to leave the beaten track and
to acknowledge conspiracy theories as a vibrant phenomenon of
popular culture which reflects far more than pathological delu-
sions or xenophobic attitudes. Inspired by the ground-breaking
work of Timothy Melley (2000) we interpret the increasing popu-
larity of conspiracy theories as an attempt to emphasize a personal
set of values and thus to organize and regulate one’s life expe-
rience in a meaningful way. According to Melley (2000), the
general motif behind conspiracy theories is to emphasize the
values of autonomy and individuality by inducing an intensive
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fear of being controlled by concealed external forces. For this
state of mind Melley has coined the term “agency panic.” By
suggesting that our personal freedom is at stake, conspiracy
theories create awareness for the (potential) threats to human
autonomy and individuality. At this point we transcend Melley
by stating that the self-affirmative mechanism behind conspir-
acy theories should work for any set of values a person wishes
to emphasize (e.g., freedom of speech, integrity of the tradi-
tional family, mental and physical health, etc.). Based on this
hypothesis, we interpret the widespread doubt in an official truth
and the great popularity of conspiracy theories as a crisis of
ideologies that goes hand in hand with a crisis of individual-
ity. Especially in pluralistic Western societies where the “grands
récits” (Lyotard, 2005) of the past have lost their credibility, con-
spiracy theories can help to express and to share an individual
system of values. When there is no generally accepted frame
of reference any more, individuation is in need for alternative
explanations.
From our point of view empirical studies on conspiracy theo-
ries have so far neglected the creative potential, the dynamic, the
interactive, and the narrative qualities of conspiracy theories. The
predominant paradigm of psychological research in the field of
conspiracy theories assumes that a clear distinction between an
official truth and delusive idiosyncratic explanations can bemade.
For instance, Lewandowsky et al. (2013) showed that taking the
moon landing for a hoax is correlated with a disbelief in climate
change and a rejection of the fact that smoking causes lung can-
cer. One can either believe that smoking causes lung cancer, or
one might not. Furthermore, as the authors point out, this is not
a question of belief in the first place; there is overwhelming scien-
tific evidence for negative side effects of smoking. To deny them
means to negate the validity of scientific knowledge in general.We
deem it questionable that doubts about the reasons for the inva-
sion of Iraq should generally be explained by the same cognitive
mechanisms.
Belief or disbelief in theories of conspiracy has been exam-
ined by reducing stories to simple statements (e.g., “9/11 was
an inside job”) that may serve as questionnaire items. First and
foremost, these items are designed to meet the psychometri-
cal requirements of questionnaire construction. Naturally, such
questionnaire items cannot reflect the complex and diverse nar-
rations entwined around ideas of conspiracy. We see dangers
in applying this approach to investigating conspiracy theories:
Without a psychological model, one can merely speculate which
latent variable or construct was measured after all. It gets hard
to distinguish possible facets of a trait—a supposed predispo-
sition to accept conspiracy theories—ex post without such a
model. Goertzel (1994) has already pointed to the weakness of
questionnaire data when it comes to people’s belief systems.
For instance, Swami et al. (2010) were able to explain 53.1%
of variance in “9/11 Conspiracist Beliefs” with a structural
equation model including personality variables. Importantly,
“General Conspiracy Beliefs” accounted for only 14.4% of vari-
ance. Wagner-Egger and Bangerter (2007) tried to identify pre-
dictors for belief in two types of conspiracy theories: Conspiracy
theories that accuse minorities (Type A) and conspiracy theo-
ries blaming authorities (Type B). No less than 18 personality
constructs were included. Regression analysis showed that these
constructs only accounted for less than 10% of variance in terms
of Type A theories (R2 = 0.09), respectively, 16% of variance in
terms of Type B theories (R2 = 0.16). Although these studies have
clearly delivered important insights, up to 90% of variance is left
unexplained.
Based on these findings and on our own questionnaire stud-
ies, we doubt whether these procedures are able to grasp the
appreciation and fascination of such theories in full. The low to
intermediary values of explained variance not only indicate that
the approaches did not cover some important factors. We also
do not know if a participant has merely adopted some overheard
notions; or if he or she has arrived at a conspiratorial belief after
time-consuming, extensive research. We also do not know if the
conspiratorial belief is stable, or if new information would be
regarded and integrated; if it is a merely personal opinion or if the
believer is eager to share his or her view with others; and finally, if
the belief would be guiding the person’s actions, e.g., if he or she
would engage in political activities.
Apart from some recent studies—e.g., Sapountzis and Condor
(2013) have evaluated the spontaneous use of conspiracy nar-
ratives in interviews of Greek citizens and Lewandowsky et al.
(2013) investigated conspiracist ideation in the blogosphere—
most studies have focused on the recipients of conspiracy theories
using questionnaires and drawing an artificial red line between
believers and disbelievers. To our understanding, this approach
reveals some misleading basic assumptions about conspiracy the-
ories: (a) Conspiracy theories are treated as invariant entities (b)
that can be reduced to single statements and (c) that recipients
of conspiracy theories can be regarded as passive consumers and
(d) that believers are always believers independently from the
“quality” of the regarding storyline. By contrast, we argue that
a majority of conspiracy theories emerge from the highly interac-
tive sphere of the newmedia. Today,millions of people around the
world create, compile, discuss, and reproduce conspiracy theories
on internet platforms, private websites, or blogs. This relent-
less process of creation, modification, and serial reproduction
blurs the classic difference of a distinction of production (sender)
and recipient. If our assumptions hold, people should—when
given the chance—construct a wide variety of stories, differing
greatly in conspiratorial characteristics. Questionnaires are hardly
able to capture the narrative process of acquisition, compilation,
and reproduction in an ecologically valid way. Consequently, we
suggest the method of narrative construction as a new means
to explore the multi-facet phenomenon of conspiracy theories.
This method allows an individual to construct their own story
for a given event like 9/11 from a set of pre-defined pieces of
information.
If a conspiracy theory is a dynamic narration reflecting an indi-
vidual’s values—built around a dramatic historic event—there
should be a plethora of different theories, not only concerning the
story’s nucleus, i.e., the historic event. The variety of personality
should, according to this assumption, lead to an evenly manifold
variety of conspiracy theories. Additionally, if it was a prevalent
method of identity shaping, almost everyone should be prone
to construct a conspiracy theory. We tested these assumptions
empirically.
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THE PRESENT PAPER
In the first section, we shortly describe a study that sought for
a link between cognitive self-efficacy and the belief in common
conspiracy theories—yet yielded no results. Subsequently, the
method of narrative construction1 is described. It was applied
in a study with 30 participants. In the following section, we
present the results of this study. Finally, we outline a theoret-
ically framework which accounts for our findings and allows
for an integration of other explanatory approaches. We then
outline the common ground of our and other models and
close with a short consideration of the dangers of conspiracy
theories.
METHODS
In our first study on conspiracy theories, we followed the estab-
lished research paradigm: A standardized questionnaire was
applied to investigate the relationship between self-efficacy and
belief in conspiracy theories. We shortly describe this study—that
yielded no positive results—before we illustrate the method of
narrative construction in detail.
In accordance with the premise that supporters of conspiracy
theories share some kind of cognitive or emotional disposition,
we expected people with a low level of self-efficacy to be more
susceptible for any kind of conspiracy theory than people who
reported a high level of self-efficacy.
Method
Our standardized questionnaire comprised the German version
of the General Self-Efficacy Scale by Schwarzer and Jerusalem
(1995). We modified some items to emphasize the cognitive
component of self-efficacy. For example, the item “Thanks to
my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situa-
tions” was changed to “Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know
how to interpret unforeseen situations.” In addition, a scale was
designed for the assessment of endorsement in conspiracy the-
ories. The scale consisted of 10 items. For each item, the gist
of a popular conspiracy theory was condensed into a state-
ment (e.g., “The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were planned and
executed by the American government.”). The participants were
asked to rate the plausibility of each statement on a five-point
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (“very implausible”) to 5 (“very
plausible”).
Sample
Twenty-two males and 41 females participated in this study. The
sample included students, workers and senior citizens. The age of
the participants ranged from 18–76 years and the average age was
29.6 years (SD = 13.3).
Results
The relation between self-efficacy and belief in conspiracy theo-
ries turned out to be non-significant, Pearson’s r = −0.04, p =
0.73, n.s. There was no pattern to be found, neither linear trends
between variables nor higher-order relations by mere inspection
1Explained in more detail in a separate manuscript recently submitted to the
same Frontiers Research Topic
of plotted data. The analysis of particular items and ex-post-facto
attempts (splitting the sample by gender, by age, etc.) yielded no
results.
Discussion
The data did not justify—or even suggest—the assumption that
self-efficacy is related to endorsement in common conspiracy
theories. Nevertheless, this finding is relevant. These results are
well in line with the results of a study by Wagner-Egger and
Bangerter (2007) which examined the link between locus of con-
trol and belief in conspiracy theories. The authors reported a
low inter-correlation between externality ratings and belief in a
particular type of conspiracy theories which accuses minorities
(r = 0.15; p < 0.05). These findings clearly challenge the basic
assumption that supporters of conspiracy theories must be con-
sidered as helpless individuals in need for clear-cut explanations.
Left with no direction how to refine the hypothesis or the ques-
tionnaires, we decided to develop a new approach for exploring
conspiracy theories
THIRTY SHADES OF TRUTH: THE METHOD OF NARRATIVE
CONSTRUCTION
To analyze the phenomenon of conspiracy theories in an eco-
logically more valid way, we developed the method of narra-
tive construction. Given a set of statements about an impor-
tant event of contemporary history, people begin to build a
narrative that is, for the most part, neither a pure official
nor a clear conspiracy theory. Instead, people construct their
idiosyncratic “shade of truth.” A more detailed description of
this method can be found elsewhere1. In the present paper,
we focus on a different aspect, but give a short account of
material and procedure so the present paper is coherent and
understandable.
To test our hypotheses that conspiracy theories are frequently
occurring and that they are diverse and idiosyncratic stories built
around an important event, we developed the method of “narra-
tive construction.” Participants are provided with a deck of cards,
each card bearing a statement related to a specified event (in our
case 9/11). The deck was built to represent conspiracy-specific
categories we had generated before with an inductive procedure.
For each “fact,” there was one version (card) holding an offi-
cial/canonical claim, one version bearing a mildly conspiratorial
allusion, and one version holding a claim only compatible with an
extreme conspiracy.
MATERIAL FOR A NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
To identify the typical constituents of conspiracy theories, we
questioned 38 people to tell us which conspiracy theories they
know of; and afterwards asked them to describe their favorite the-
ory in detail. Subsequently, we asked “which elements are part
of most conspiracy theories” as an open question. The answers
were categorized by other interviewers; the resulting categories
had to be defended in a discussion, as described by Mayring
(2005), until all interviewers had agreed on a set of six categories
for “elements of conspiracy theories,” including category defini-
tions. The bottom-up generated items are odd event, evidence,
non-transparency, publicity, group of conspirers, andmyth. A more
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detailed description of this study and its results can be found
elsewhere1.
We compiled 14 subsets for the deck of cards. With respect to
the bottom-up derived elements of conspiracy theories: two for
group of conspirers, one for non-transparency, one for publicity,
three for odd event, three for evidence, and one for myth. Subset
group consisted of three items (i.e., 3 cards) fueled with con-
tents from typical (1) official, (2) limited conspiratorial, and (3)
unlimited conspiratorial viewpoints. The official card always bore
a category-related statement that was in accordance with official
9/11 reports and documents (drawing on respectable sources, e.g.,
governmental reports made public on the internet). For example,
an official group of conspirers-item was: “9/11 masterminds were
Islamist terrorists, led by Osama bin Laden, to attack the detested
Western culture.”
The limited conspiratorial card was prepared with an item that
contained an explanation describing a conspiracy of moderate
strength. Specifically, this level was formed in accordance with
Lutter’s (2001) categorization of conspiracies, corresponding to
a conspiracy limited in time and space. This can also be thought
as matching 9/11-view “let it happen on purpose” (“LIHOP” in
the terminology of Ganser, n.d.). In this view, the Bush admin-
istration did not initiate the attacks but knew beforehand and
did not take countermeasures. We compiled information from
web resources like Wikipedia that matched this level. The “group
of conspirers”-item here read: “The US administration had let
happen the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq.”
The unlimited conspiratorial card assumed a conspiracy with
no clear bounds within space and time, or a “make it happen
on purpose” (MIHOP) viewpoint in the sense of Ganser (n.d.)
For example, it read: “The US administration had planned and
conducted the 9/11 attack to justify the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq.”
This three-level graduation was realized for each subset of
cards. Finally, for each of the six categories (odd event, evidence,
non-transparency, publicity, group of conspirers, and myth),
there was at least one three-part subset of cards (one card with an
official statement, one limited conspiratorial, and one unlimited
conspiratorial).
Additionally, we compiled a triplet of cards where all state-
ments were completely off-wall:
- The group “Scholars for 9/11 truth” assumes that energy
weapon fire, by killer satellites from outer space, led to the
World Trade Center collapse.
- The former officer of nuclear intelligence and author Dimitri
Khalezov postulates that the Twin Towers as well as build-
ing No. 7 were brought down by underground thermo-nuclear
devices.
- The Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra has reported that 4000 Jewish
WTC employees were warned beforehand and did not show up
on work on 9/11.
The resulting 42 cards—13 canonical statements, 13 state-
ments alluring to a limited conspiracy, 13 extremely/unlimited
conspiratorial statements, and 3 off-wall assumptions—were
printed on cards (each around 10× 6 cm; serif typeface, 12 pt.
size, black letters on white ground) and laminated.
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty persons (26 female,Mage = 22.4 years, range: 19–55 years)
took part in the study. Some were students at the University of
Bamberg and received course credit for participation; they were
naïve to the aim of the study and had not been involved in any
other study described in this paper. The participants were ran-
domly assigned to two groups: (1) modest contents group and (2)
extreme contents group. The first group received the off-wall, the
canonical, and the limited conspiratorial items only. The extreme
contents group was handed out the full set including the 13
unlimited conspiratorial items. The split-up was done to test a
hypothesis not discussed in this paper.
PROCEDURE
The modest contents group was handed out a card deck with 29
items, containing all official and limited conspiratorial items (plus
the three-card subset absurd). The extreme contents group received
the same deck and additionally 13 unlimited conspiratorial items.
All were asked to “construct a plausible story of the events of
September 11th 2001, as a single coherent story or consisting of
coherent or controversial fragments,” without time restrictions.
When the participant had considered the story finished, the cho-
sen items and their layout were written down. The participant was
then asked to rate “how plausible the 9/11 story version just laid
out is” on a five-point Likert-scale (among other questions related
to other hypotheses). Overall, the participants spent 21min on
average to construct their story, with a range from 8min to well
over 30min.
RESULTS
We will present quantitative data analysis first. In order to
acknowledge the diversity in story content, we will then present
three single cases, i.e., three individual theories about 9/11.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We found no significant differences between groups with regard
to the number of items taken from the off-wall set, tested by
separate One-Way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA), F(1, 28) < 1,
p = 0.836, n.s.; with regard to self-rated plausibility of the story,
F(1, 28) < 1, p = 0.451, n.s.; and with regard to the number of
cards selected in total, F(1, 28) < 1, p = 0.80, n.s. In the aspects
relevant for the argumentation and discussion here the groups
do not differ, so we will aggregate both samples to a single one.
Detailed further analyses on the given data set can be found
elsewhere1.
On average, participants used 14.80 statements/cards (SD =
5.47; range: 5–28 cards) to construct a story, 0.50 cards (SD =
0.86, range: 0–3) of them were from the off-wall set. The average
self-rated plausibility was 3.90 (SD = 0.71, range: 2–5).
There was a wide variety of length and content with regard to
the theories produced. No two stories were alike; instead, highly
idiosyncratic mixtures of statements were created. Figure 1 gives
an impression of the diversity of compositions.
To reduce complexity and to test our hypotheses, we segre-
gated the stories according to the share of official vs. limited and
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FIGURE 1 | Each participant created a unique story, blending official, limited, and unlimited conspiratorial items to build a plausible 9/11 narrative.
unlimited conspiratorial items. Here, we regard stories containing
less than 33% conspiratorial items to be an “official version” of
9/11. Stories containing between 33 and 66% conspiratorial con-
tent were classified as a “hybrid version.” When more than 66%
conspiracy-items were present, we considered the narrative as a
“conspiracy version.”
With this deliberate categorization, 5 out of 30 stories (16.7%)
qualified as official, 16 out of 30 stories as hybrid (53.3%), and
the 9 remaining stories (30.0%) as conspiracy versions. We could
neither detect a significant correlation between the self-rated
plausibility and the number of off-wall items selected (r = 0.28,
p = 0.88, n.s.) nor between plausibility and the number of items
selected in total (r = −0.09, p = 0.62, n.s.). Regarding the con-
tent of the off-wall items, the killer satellites from outer space were
present in three stories. Nine times, the thermo-nuclear devices
were part of a story. The allegation of Jews knowing about the
attacks beforehand was selected four times.
A GAME OF CONSPIRACIES: EXAMPLES FOR 9/11 NARRATIVES
So far, we have analyzed only superficial information (e.g., num-
ber of items; composition of different item categories) of the
generated versions. To understand the stories behind these num-
bers, we present three examples in detail (yet, each example is
an abridged version; the full narratives were at least twice the
length). We begin with a corner-case, the most canonical version
that was produced. We proceed with a typical hybrid version that
integrates many official statements as well as some propositions
indicating a possible cover-up. Finally, we give an account of the
most extreme conspiracy version that was built.
A canonical story: On 9/11, four passenger planes got hijacked by
Islamist suicide attackers; two of these planes were directed into the
WTC twin towers. The resulting structural damage to the buildings
led to their collapse. When President Bush was told about the second
plane crashing into the towers, he kept sitting for five minutes—
with countenance unaffected and seemingly not surprised—in front
of the class at school, without interrupting the visit. On the day of the
attacks, there was great confusion among the leading action forces.
The chain of command expended too much time, as the US admin-
istration was not prepared for this kind of attack. Thus, the plane
heading for the Pentagon could not be brought down in time. The
9/11 course of events was examined by several US agencies, support-
ing the official view. This was written down, for example, in the ‘9/11
Commission Report’.
This is an abridged version of the only story (out of the sample
of 30) that contains virtually no allegation to any conspiracy or
cover-up. The originator, a 20-year-old woman, used seven items
in total. Subsequently, she rated her story as most plausible (5 out
of 5 points). The participant stated that she had “little interest
on the issue of 9/11,” and that she had “recognized conspirato-
rial items,” but had discarded them as being “too speculative”;
furthermore, she stated to have heard “about the unreliability of
eye-witness in a lecture” some days before, and stated this might
have made her “more cautious.”
A hybrid theory: The 9/11 perpetrators had been Islamist terror-
ists under guidance by Osama Bin Laden to attack the hated “West”.
Islamist terrorists had hijacked four passenger planes, two of which
were directed into the twin towers. Standard operating procedures
for hijackings were bureaucratic and chain of command operated
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slowly. There were lapses, failures, and precious time was lost. There
should be further inquiries to clear up the countless open questions.
The attack on Pearl Harbor was let happen by the US administra-
tion to get the own, war-weary people into WW II. Similar could
have happened on 9/11.
This is the abridged version of a typical hybrid story, con-
structed by a 25-year-old woman. The narrative combines official
as well as mildly/limited conspiratorial items. While Islamist
terrorists are identified as perpetrators, the possibility of a gov-
ernment letting happen the attack is included in the narrative.
The creator of the story rated her story with 4 on the 5-point
plausibility scale afterwards.
A conspiracy theory: The US administration has initiated 9/11
itself, to justify the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There should be
further inquiries to clear up the countless open questions. The US
administration is lying. It was lying about the supposed nuclear
weapons in Iraq, about Vietnam, Watergate, about many things.
Why should one believe the ‘official’ 9/11 story? The WTC towers
had been built with fire-resistant steel. The question remains: How
could the towers had collapsed? The magazine Newsweek was report-
ing that high rank Pentagon officials had canceled flights scheduled
for 9/11. According to the Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra, 4,000 Jewish
employees did not show up at work on 9/11; they had been warned.
There was and is one constant in the USA’s policy: lie, deceit, and
deception of her enemies and the public. This can be seen with Pearl
Harbor, Watergate, the landing on the moon, and in recent times the
9/11 attacks.
This is the abridged version of the story constructed by a
26-year-old woman. She was the only participant to include
not a single item from the pool of official statements, using
nine mildly/limited and nine extremely/unlimited conspirato-
rial items. Concerning plausibility, she rated her story with 4
afterwards.
DISCUSSION
The multiplicity in the content of conspiracy theories that was
predicted by our assumption is clearly reflected by the obtained
data. There was no dichotomy between official and conspirato-
rial; instead, we found “thirty shades of truth.” There was no
restriction regarding the combination of items, and the state-
ments stemmed from real-world sources and had not been fitted
for representativeness (regarding the levels official, limited, and
unlimited conspiratorial). We therefore cannot infer a strict rank
ordering of the stories. Our deliberate trifold categorization must
hence be considered a rough measure. Yet, regarding the shares of
official and conspiratorial items, our data shows the tendency to
construct conspiracy theories, although in most cases, moderate
ones. Interestingly, the only strictly canonical story was delib-
erately constructed by a person that reported to have no great
interest in the matters of 9/11.
Furthermore, in the short survey after the experiment, many
participants stated that it was fun to compile an explanation for
the events on 9/11, while the plausibility of the stories was high,
assessed by ratings afterwards. In our view, this is a strong argu-
ment for ecological validity; it implies that people were engaged
in a cognitive as well as an emotional way.
A possible limitation can be seen in the fact that we asked
German people to construct a 9/11 narrative; for sure, a sam-
ple from the USA would yield other results. Yet, our goal was
to induce active story construction, so we deliberately chose this
topic: We could be sure every participant knew of this event; and
at the same time we could be fairly sure there was no personal
involvement—in a sense that a participant might have known one
of the 9/11 victims personally.
The hypothesis that people with a low feeling of security are
particularly prone to conspiracy theories—a hypothesis derived
from the literature (e.g., Goertzel, 1994)—was not confirmed by
the data of our first study. Statistical power was not sufficient
to refute this hypothesis in general, but low self-efficacy at least
does not seem to be a major factor. General racist beliefs as com-
mon drivers for conspiracies (e.g., Grüter, 2010) did not appear
to be a relevant factor of influence with our sample, either. Only
a minority (4 out of 30) chose to integrate the card claiming
that Jews knew of the attacks beforehand into their storyline.
The item explicitly ascribed the statement to a Syrian newspa-
per, so choosing it would have left a cognitive back door—the
anti-Semitic allegation could be attributed to the source; hence,
picking this card could be justified in the sense of “I do not
believe it, but I believe that a Syrian newspaper wrote it.” The
claim that thermo-nuclear devices had been mounted in the Twin
Towers seemed to be more plausible, as it was chosen by nine
participants.
In sum, two of the most common explanations for inter-
individual differences in terms of conspiracy endorsement—need
for security and racist attitudes toward minorities—could not
be confirmed as driving factors. What, then, could be motifs
to construct conspiracy theories? In the following sections we
present a theoretical framework which accounts for the subtle
“shades of truth” revealed by narrative construction, as well as
the common deficit-oriented approaches focusing on extreme
tendencies of conspiracy beliefs. This theoretical framework is
based on the assumption that conspiracy theories are means to
express personal beliefs and values, to relate these values to con-
temporary history, and to engage in discussions about values and
agency.
Our method of narrative construction does not aim at mea-
suring a latent variable as, by contrast, an intelligence test does.
Instead, its purpose is to initiate a process in an ecologically
valid way. Thus, we cannot determine reliability in the sense
of classical test theory. Stability, as a special case of reliability,
will have to be determined in a further study. If our hypothesis
holds and conspiracy theories are a means of expressing one’s
personal values, this does not imply that a participant chooses
exactly the same items on the following day. Nevertheless, it
implies that the set of values reflected by this individual’s sto-
ries should remain stable even over the course of months or
years.
Our next step will be to address reliability in terms of stability,
as it is crucial for our claims. A data-driven system of analysis will
be designed to categorize the beliefs and values implied by a story.
Moreover, participants will be asked to state their most important
values explicitly. By employing a longitudinal design changes and
invariants will be examined.
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THE TWILIGHT OF MYTH
The universality of certain narrative patterns and symbols
has already been pointed out by Sigmund Freud and Carl
Gustav Jung. They hypothesized that the exploration of myths—
individual stories like dreams as well as universal ones—is a via
regia for understanding the human psyche. Different academic
disciplines try to fathom out the universality of myth and religion,
emphasizing an interplay of nature and culture (Burkert, 2009) or
cognitive operators that were shaped by evolution (Newberg et al.,
2003). According to Bischof (1998), the structural universality of
myths about world creation can be explained without assuming
a collective unconscious. He argues that myths about world cre-
ation reflect the development of consciousness every individual
experiences during early ontogenesis.
The existence of myths was a cultural constant and served to
exemplify and consolidate group norms. The advent of the “self-
expressive individual” (Campbell, 2008), however, rendered these
myths meaningless and left the individual in the dark about desir-
able goals in life. With the beginning of enlightenment, assigning
an individual his or her place in society by a story has begun to
lose its importance. In return, the individual has to bear the bur-
den of shaping society: “It is not society that is to guide and save
the creative hero, but precisely the reverse. And so every one of us
shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of the redeemer—
not in the bright moments of his tribe’s great victories, but in the
silence of his personal despair” (Campbell, 2008, p. 337).
When stories, oral and written, have been the primordial and
most important means to negotiate the relation between individ-
ual and society, we might assume that the means might prevail,
even when the focus changes. It is desirable to know one’s own
motifs. At least, we deem it worthwhile to take this stance—
and to see if it will be generative. Consequently, we will consider
conspiracy theories as narrations that help people to recognize
themselves, to define and express their system of values, and also
to help them to articulate their demands on society. This does not
necessarily imply that conspiracy theories are modern myths. In
the first place, they are stories intertwined with defining society
and ourselves; and successors of stories called myths, which had
a distinctly different function, and distinctly different structural
features.
A similar viewpoint was taken by Kelley-Romano (2008). She
examined the television series The X-Files and concluded that the
function of ubiquitous conspiracy in the series “defines what it
means to be good or evil and simultaneously questions the pro-
cess of identity formation itself” (Kelley-Romano, 2008, p. 106).
Although the author recognized the psychological functions of
the series’ conspiratorial motives as crucial for its success, she did
not describe the psychological parts of her theory in more detail.
Today, identity formation (at least in Western cultures) might
be considered as the challenge to shape society and oneself. This
does not necessarily have to be a painful process. For some, anxi-
ety and a loss of control might be predominant, probably those of
them who show a low degree of ambiguity tolerance in the sense
of an “emotional and perceptual personality variable” (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949). Some will meet this challenge with indifference.
For others, it might appear as a playful and exciting endeavor to
shape one’s identity, probably on basis of the mere attempt to
bring order into the story (see the “Aesthetic Aha” effect in Muth
and Carbon, 2013), although a final solution might not be the
ultimate source of reward (Muth and Carbon, 2013; Muth et al.,
in press). Embracing this full rangemight help to understand why
conspiracy theories are not a well-separated niche of psychology
and society—but, according to our data, pervasive.
SHAPING THE PILLARS OF THE SELF
Dan McAdams assumed that “we are all tellers of tales”
(McAdams, 1993) by the mere fact. Tales appear to him as a
means to achieve self-insight, as a very basic way of organizing
information—and a way to share this information, also about the
coordinates of oneself within the society, in the world. McAdams
integrates biological, developmental and cognitive aspects to
explain why certain characters (like the Teacher, the Warrior, the
Maker, the Friend, and the Survivor) frequently appear in such
stories. During adolescence certain questions arise. For instance:
“What is good? What is true? What is beautiful? How does the
world work? How should the world work?” (McAdams, 1993,
p. 82) The benefit of stories for self-awareness, their potential to
render non-conscious ideas and values explicit, is also emphasized
by Wilson (2002).
Right after puberty, stories like legends andmyths are replaced
by “theories and creeds and other systematic explications”
(McAdams, 1993, p. 85). Such theories offer the opportunity to
define the goodness (and badness) of very specific actions, and
to evaluate them. The acquired belief and value system is likely
to stay—with changes in detail—for the rest of one’s lifetime
forming the basis for the story that reflects and forges our self
in adulthood.
It is noteworthy that a theory “impressively differentiated and
integrated” (McAdams, 1993, p. 90) might be considered “partic-
ularly mature, advanced and enlightened” (p. 90). McAdams did
not have conspiracy theories inmind; from a formal point of view,
however, conspiracy theories also match his criteria. Particularly,
the high degree of differentiation is one of the most striking fea-
tures of conspiracy theories. We also observe that several story
parts of a conspiracy theory are imperatively held together, at least
by ad-hoc explanations or flexible interpretations of several parts
toward a coherent Gestalt. This is also an important difference
between a conspiracy “theory” and a truly scientific theory—the
first one might be driven and put together by scientifically invalu-
able arguments but will yield a story which attracts people and
which invites to fill the logical gaps by own considerations. This
will raise the mere consumer to the position of the narrator and
the creator her/himself.
The shift from society to the individual when it comes to defin-
ing values, however, should not be seen as a burden alone. Gergen
(2006) sums up a debate about the consequences of emphasiz-
ing the distinction between oneself and the others: Becoming an
individual implies the danger of isolation and alienation. Melley
(2000) makes a similar point by hypothesizing that a certain
amount of paranoia is not only a defense, but even a part of liberal
individualism.
In La condition postmoderne, Jean-Francois Lyotard claims that
the collapse of the grand narratives does not necessarily imply an
atomization of society. Being part of a fabric of relations, even
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“the most underprivileged self” (Lyotard, 2005, p. 55) is not pow-
erless in the language games of global communication. The self
can treat messages as if it were the sender, the receiver, or the
relator (Lyotard, 2005). Likewise, a conspiracy theory is an invita-
tion to receive information, to share information, and also to add
new information, in the end: to be a part of the generation and
evolution process of a story.
Thus, conspiracy theories offer a further dimension interest-
ing from a psychological standpoint. They offer the possibility
to transfer one’s value system into the social domain: According
to Mason (1997), the moral self must learn to discern the val-
ues held by other persons and institutions; and should encourage
others to act morally. Fivush and Buckner (1997) argue that lan-
guage is not only a medium, but is both necessary to construct a
self-concept and to engage in moral-based interaction with oth-
ers. From this point of view, making stories that describe the
ethics of institutions as well as one’s own is not a possibility, but a
necessity in moral development. Also, sharing these narratives is
desirable.
A conspiracy theory, thus, could be seen as a differentiated
story of our beliefs and values helping us to understand and
express our non-conscious moral feelings. Historic or contempo-
rary events and developments which threaten these values may
become the initial nucleus for such a story. The need to construct
such a story arises from living in a society where the generally
acknowledged goal of individuation is no longer a mere adop-
tion of common beliefs, but where becoming individual is the
preferred goal.
Furthermore, a conspiracy theory would allow us to share our
beliefs with others and tomake us (and others) cautious about the
violation of ethical standards. Horstmann (2012) even hypothe-
sizes that apocalyptic scenarios, for example about WorldWar III,
are the main reason such scenarios have not become reality so far.
Narratives about dystopian developments make us aware of such
developments in the first place.
Likewise, in conspiracy theories such scenarios are a com-
mon topic. This need not end in a feeling of helplessness, or,
as Melley (2000) termed it, agency panic. A conspiracy the-
ory might be considered as a remedy; yet, not only in the way
described by Melley as a defense mechanism of individualism:
social exchange about a supposed conspiracy is comforting and
reassuring. Taking part in such language games requires a widely
known story nucleus (e.g., the terrorist attacks of 9/11), so others
recognize the importance of the story and can affiliate. We might
consider a good conspiracy theory as a kind of interface to find
like-minded people and to overcome alienation.
THE CONSPIRACY CODE
So far, we have considered:
- The importance of stories, to be more precise, of mythical
stories, in human history.
- The importance of stories that mirror a person’s belief and
value system as ameans of individuation. They explicate what is
good or bad and can be considered helpful to shape one’s value
system by organizing one’s life experience in a meaningful way.
- The potential to find like-minded people by engaging in the
active exchange of value-expressing stories.
However, the psychological importance of narratives does not
explain: Why is a conspiracy theory a method of choice? A story
about morale, i.e., what is right and wrong, will necessarily
include both moral extremes. A rivalry between good and bad
allows the storyteller to make clear which side he or she is on.
However, it would be comforting if evil deeds are done by a man-
ageable part of society, not by the majority; otherwise, one would
cast himself an outsider. Additionally, these deeds must be con-
cealed, too; in other respects, the majority of society would have
noticed andwould either approve of these deeds, or be indifferent.
Both options would be discomforting.
Here we meet with existing approaches to the phenomenon of
conspiracy theories. Many observed features suit perfectly with
our assertions sketched here:
- An immunization against counter-evidence makes a narration
invulnerable. If the story reflects a person’s most important
beliefs and values, it is quite understandable why immunization
is desirable.
- Four people had selected the item alleging to a Jewish involve-
ment. The result suggests that anti-Semitic beliefs were present
in our sample; but four out of 30 people might indicate that
xenophobia is not the heart of every conspiracy theory. Yet,
a conspiracy is in need for conspirers. We acknowledge the
danger that some peoplemight rely upon existing stereotypes—
e.g., prejudice about Jews or Muslims. Exploiting such biases
would indeed be a result of, not a reason for, conspiracy theo-
ries. An exemption would be a person who holds racist beliefs
as most important conviction. The whole theory would be built
around these convictions then—and mirror the psychological
motifs described by Moscovici (1987).
- A powerless and underprivileged person might be in need to
understand why he or she has failed in life; that means him or
her as a person, with beliefs about right and wrong. We indeed
could expect him or her to construct a rather extreme narrative
that mirrors the severity of his failure in life. Here, attributional
mechanisms to uphold the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980)
would be relevant, as described by Farr (1987).
Of course, a highly immunized, racist, and extreme conspir-
acy theory stands out. It attracts the attention of society and,
consequently, of psychologists—and we indeed need to under-
stand and explain the person behind such stories. In our sample,
at least the one conspiracy theory we have stated in detail here
would qualify for this extreme. But aside from this extreme shade
of truth: there were 29 stories that demand deeper and more
differentiated psychological analysis. When we regard conspiracy
theories as a continuum of identity-shaping potential, the phe-
nomenon is demystified. This will be an important step toward
the appreciation “to what extent conspiracy theories reflect every-
day cognitions” (Swami and Coles, 2010, p. 563).
This, of course, does not render research on individual dif-
ferences useless. Actually, this specific research is highly rele-
vant for our approach. Stories in general—and life stories in
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particular—are highly intertwined with a storyteller’s personal-
ity. We assume that individual values determine the content of
a conspiracy theory. We further assume that personality moder-
ates if this theory is, for example, open for new evidence or highly
immunized. Consequently, we suggest to further explore and ana-
lyze these interdependencies between content and shape. Themere
form—a story about secret and potentially harmful deeds—would
then be of lesser psychological relevance.
However, we must not neglect the fact of the harmful potential
these theories bear. Considering them as an omnipresent and—in
principle—benign psychological phenomenon helps us to explore
why some people fall for extreme conspiratorial constructs of
ideas which might lead to xenophobic or even racist argu-
ments. It might also help us to understand how agitators delib-
erately use conspiracy theories to transport hateful ideology—
wrapped up in a plausible plot that masks these foul intentions
(Byford and Billig, 2001; Wood and Finlay, 2008). The question
should not be: Why does one believe a racist conspiracy theory?
Rather, we should ask: Why does one believe a racist conspiracy
theory?
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